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Introduction 
The human right to just and favourable working conditions offers a promising way of 
articulating the injustice suffered by workers who toil in substandard conditions. 
However, if we take seriously the objection that, for many workers living in poor 
countries, neither their employer nor their government can responsibly fulfil the right 
at this time, we may be tempted to reject the idea that there can be such a right. This 
paper argues that even if we accept the claim that in many cases employers and state 
governments cannot or should not unilaterally fulfil the right, we need not abandon 
the idea that that it is a universal human right. In the sections that follow I propose a 
structural understanding of the right, according to which the human right outlines 
how social structure must be as a matter of fundamental justice. This is in contrast to 
the standard claim-based understanding, which requires that for there to be a human 
right it must be the case that for every human we can identify an agent whom their 
claim is against, specify what the claim requires, and show that fulfilment of the claim 
constitutes the fulfilment of the right and is in fact owed to the right-holder. The paper 
outlines how the right to just and favourable conditions of work runs into difficulties 
in fulfilling these conditions when understood as a claim against the individual's 
employer or government. The paper then suggests that if we instead identify the right 
as a standard that must be met by the social structure, such obstacles are averted, and 
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we can recognise a universal moral right held by all people at this time, even those 
living in places where it would be irresponsible or impossible for employers or 
national governments to unilaterally and immediately fulfil the right. It is explained 
that adopting this structural understanding of the right requires the rejection of the 
idea that strict 'claimability' (Tomalty 2014) is an existence condition for a human 
right. 
The paper explains that the seriousness and significance of the threat of poor 
working conditions makes a right to just and favourable working conditions a strong 
candidate for recognition as a human right. It proposes an account of human rights as 
standards of fundamental justice that the social structure must meet for every 
individual. It explains that agents have a range of moral duties with regard to such 
demands of fundamental justice, including collectivization duties (Collins 2013) that 
require all persons to act responsively with a view to establishing and maintaining a 
social structure in which these rights are fulfilled for every contemporary human. 
However, it explains that it is not individual rights that justify the imposition of 
collectivization duties. Rather, it is the sum total of all demands of fundamental 
justice that justify the duties to collectivise and secure them. 
The paper draws on Iris Marion Young’s account of social structure (Young 
2011), but it differs from her discussions of labour justice (Young 2010) in using the 
approach to understand the human right to just and favourable working conditions. 
The resulting account bears similarities to Pogge’s discussion of human rights (Pogge 
2008, 2010), but focuses not, as Pogge does, on coercively imposed institutional 
orders (domestic and international), but on the character of social structure more 
broadly construed.1 The account of the right articulated in this paper is a form of 
‘broad political account’ according to Valentini’s typology (Valentini 2012), and the 
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analysis here is in keeping with Elizabeth Ashford’s recommendation that we move 
away from requiring negative perfect duties of non-violation to correlate with human 
rights (Ashford 2006, 2007). The paper interprets the international human rights 
covenants as recognising requirements of fundamental justice that are justifiable 
independent of their recognition or enforcement locally, nationally or globally.  
Section 1 outlines a claim-based account of human rights. It examines the 
models of employer and state government as primary duty-bearers and explains how 
critics could dismiss the right to just and favourable working conditions when it is 
interpreted in either of these ways. Section 2 proposes that the claim-based account 
could be dropped in favour of a structural account of the right that recognises it to be 
a social structural standard required as a matter of fundamental justice. It explains 
how adopting such an account can allow us to recognise such a right even when 
employers and governments cannot or should not immediately and unilaterally fulfil 
the right. Section 3 specifies that according to this approach the right does not have 
correlative duties the fulfilment of which constitutes the fulfilment of the right; thus, 
the account rejects direct ‘claimability’ (Tomalty 2014) as an existence condition for 
human rights. The section then identifies the duties that various agents have with 
regard to the realisation of human rights understood as structural requirement of 
fundamental justice. Section 4 defends the account from the objection that what it 
outlines cannot be a right because it does not offer a normative role distinct from a 
goal or interest. The conclusion recaps the arguments made.  
 
Scepticism regarding the right to just and favourable working conditions 
Article 7 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) states that all people are entitled to enjoy ‘just and favourable 
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conditions of work’. It specifies that this requires: remuneration which provides a 
decent living for the worker and their family; healthy and safe working conditions; the 
reasonable limitation of working hours; and periodic holidays with pay (United 
Nations General Assembly 1966).2 A preliminary case for this being a genuine human 
right will now be made based on the idea that human rights protect contemporary 
people from standard threats (Shue 1966) to their inherent dignity.3  Working in 
unhealthy or unsafe conditions threatens the life, health and wellbeing of the worker; 
excessive hours of work undermines health and wellbeing and prevents the worker 
from pursuing their interests and associating with their friends and family; if time off 
is not paid there is a significant risk that the worker will not be able to afford to 
pursue plans and nurture personal relationships; and low pay prevents the worker 
from adequately supporting themselves and their dependents and prevents them from 
pursuing their interests (where work provides the family’s sole or main income, as is 
the case for many people in contemporary societies). Thus it is clear that work that 
does not meet these conditions in contemporary societies threatens workers’ health 
and wellbeing, prevents them from exercising basic autonomy and undermines their 
status as social equals. On this basis, a case can be made that such work represents a 
morally significant threat to workers’ fundamental interests and essential dignity. The 
extent to which people currently toil in conditions that fail to meet these standards is 
evidence that poor working conditions are a standard threat in the contemporary 
world. In Madagascar, 80 per cent of those engaged in waged or salaried labour live 
on less than $2 a day (PPP) and over half of these live on less than $1.25 a day 
(International Labour Organization 2013). At the Foxconn mega-factory in China, 
workers have to do thirty-six hours’ overtime a month on top of the average eight 
hours a day, six to seven days a week, which constitute their regular hours (Fair Labor 
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Association 2012). Many garment workers in Indonesia are employed through 
agencies and do not receive paid annual leave (International Textile and Garment 
Workers Federation 2011), while in the Savar tragedy in Bangladesh in 2013, 1,000 
workers died after their factory collapsed due to a failure to comply with basic safety 
precautions (Associated Press 2013). 
Thus it looks as if there is a strong case for recognising a human right to just 
and favourable working conditions. However, according to a traditional claim-based 
account of human rights, in order for working standards to be a matter of human 
rights they must be capable of being formulated as claims of which every 
contemporary person could legitimately demand the fulfilment. Unfortunately, it is 
not clear that the issue of poor working conditions can be formulated as a moral claim 
that every contemporary person can demand some identifiable agent or set of agents 
immediately fulfil. This conundrum is the subject of this paper. 
Onora O’Neill has argued that it is a mistake to formulate requirements of 
social justice as a matter of human rights when they do not fit the logic of a moral 
right (O'Neill 2005). Human rights are usually understood to be Hohfeldian claim 
rights (O'Neill 2005, Wenar 2005, Ashford 2006, Valentini 2012, Collins 2016). A 
claim right is a claim (or set of claims) to action or forbearance that is owed by some 
agent (or set of agents) to the right-holder. Thus valid claim rights must have valid 
counterpart obligations the fulfilment of which constitutes the fulfilment of the right 
(O'Neill 2005). Human rights are usually understood to be rights held by every 
contemporary human. Thus, according to this understanding of human rights, for 
there to be a human right it must be the case that for every person there is some agent 
or set of agents who has obligations to act or forbear in a way that constitutes the 
fulfilment of the right, and it must be the case that compliance with these obligations 
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is in fact owed to the right-holder (Hohfeld 1913, O'Neill 2005, Wenar 2005, Ashford 
2007, Cruft 2012). Thus, according to the claim-right approach, there can only be a 
human right if the following conditions are met: we can identify duty-bearers for 
every human; what the duty-bearers are required to do can be adequately specified; 
the fulfilment of these obligations constitutes the fulfilment of the right; and it is the 
case that the identified duty-bearers do in fact owe the fulfilment of the duties 
identified to the right-holders.4  
As O’Neill has noted (O'Neill 2005), for many of the socio-economic rights 
identified in the ICESCR it is difficult to identify agents who have specifiable duties 
to act in order to fulfil the right for every right-holder and who do indeed owe 
compliance with these duties to the right-holder. For some of these purported rights, 
the problem is that it is unclear how to fulfil them: it is not obvious which action 
should be taken because there is not one means to fulfilling the right that is salient. In 
other cases, the issue is determining who out of a number of potential agents should 
act or forbear. In a third kind of cases, the problem is that for many contemporary 
humans there is no existing agent who should act so as to immediately fulfil the right 
– either because there is simply no agent who is able to act so as to fulfil the right, or 
because there is no agent who should do so. Along these lines, Maurice Cranston, an 
early critic of socio-economic rights, argues that many purported human rights are 
‘impossible’ (Cranston 1983). He explains that poor governments in countries that 
have not yet industrialised cannot possibly provide goods such as paid holidays to 
their populations because they lack the required wealth. Thus Cranston argues that 
those who live in poor countries cannot have such rights, and thus these rights cannot 
be universal human rights.5 In a critique that bears similarities to O’Neill’s (2005), 
Cranston holds that for something to be a right it must be something that can and 
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should be respected immediately in the here and now, and not merely something that 
is a desirable goal or laudable aspiration (Cranston 1983).  
Inspired by Cranston’s and O’Neill’s scepticism, let us turn to the difficulty in 
identifying duties and duty-bearers in the case of the purported human right to just 
and favourable conditions of work. Whether these difficulties really do give us 
grounds to dismiss the idea that there is a human right to just and favourable working 
conditions can then be considered.  
 
The ‘employer as primary duty-bearer’ model 
The right to just and favourable working conditions could be understood as a general 
moral right not to be employed under conditions that are not just and favourable, 
corresponding to a general moral duty not to employ anyone under conditions that are 
not just and favourable. According to this account, when an employer hires a person 
under conditions that are not just and favourable they violate that person’s human 
rights. This approach to the right to just and favourable working conditions is 
straightforward and appealing. However, it is vulnerable to the following critique.  
Some economists and moral theorists argue that we need to accept sweatshop 
labour as a means of improving the lives of those living in the developing world 
(Krugman 1999, MacAskill 2015). They argue that where a significant proportion of a 
country’s population is barely scraping by through subsistence farming, or where 
there is widespread unemployment and few social benefits for the unemployed, those 
living in poverty have an interest in being offered paid work even if it does not meet 
the conditions for being just and favourable. Such critics can use the fact that many 
accept work under substandard conditions as evidence that this is indeed the case. In 
such conditions, if potential employers really do face a choice between not employing 
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anyone and employing them on terms that are not just and favourable because they 
cannot afford to pay good wages and guarantee fair conditions as well as stay in 
business, then offering work on conditions that are not just and favourable may be 
better than not offering such work. If this is the case, it is implausible that they have 
an all things considered duty not to offer such employment. Accordingly, there cannot 
be a right to not be employed under such conditions that all contemporary people can 
claim, and thus there cannot be a human right to just and favourable conditions of 
work according to the strict traditional claim-based account articulated above. This 
suggests that in spite of the importance of protecting the fundamental interests and 
essential dignity of those who work for a living, there cannot be a human right to just 
and favourable working conditions because in some existing conditions employers 
should not abstain from employing people on terms that fail to meet these standards. 
If we accept that there are indeed conditions in which putative employers cannot 
afford to offer just and favourable conditions and continue to employ people, we will 
either be forced to give up the idea that there can be a human right to just and 
favourable conditions of work, or adopt a different account of the right.  
 
The ‘state government as primary duty-bearer’ model 
According to an alternative account of the right to just and favourable working 
conditions, the primary duties with regard to this right falls on state governments 
rather than potential employers. Instead of seeing the state as having secondary duties 
to impose employers’ primary duties, this approach identifies workers’ rights as 
primarily moral claims that the state government must fulfil. According to this 
approach, where states fail to secure just and favourable working conditions for a 
person under their authority they fail to fulfil that person’s human rights.6 
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To this approach it could be objected that in current conditions many state 
governments actually have good moral reasons not to impose strict labour regulations. 
If this is correct, then there is not a strict duty on all state governments to fulfil this 
claim and thus there cannot be a universal human right to just and favourable working 
conditions.  
It is plausible to believe that state governments have stringent moral duties to 
reduce poverty and not to adopt policy that makes their poorest citizens worse off. 
Where parts of their population are significantly deprived and lack the resources to 
fulfil their basic needs these duties should be given urgent priority. It has often been 
argued that in developing countries imposing stringent labour rights will make the 
poorest parts of the population worse off (World Bank 1990, Portes 1994). It can be 
argued, that poorer countries must offer an advantage over industrialised competitors 
if they are to secure adequate investment to support development and help more of 
their people out of poverty. This means they often have good reasons to ensure that 
labour remains significantly cheaper than it is in industrialised countries. In existing 
conditions this will often mean they should not impose labour standards that meet the 
conditions outlined in the ICESCR (Busse 2002). Thus it can be argued that poorer 
countries can only reduce poverty and support development in current global 
conditions if they refrain from imposing strict labour standards of the kind identified 
in the ICESCR (Portes 1994, Krugman 1999).7 
If unilaterally imposing strict working conditions in the short term will 
undermine a country’s industrialisation and thus prevent it from reducing domestic 
poverty, it is implausible that governments in poor countries have a duty to 
immediately impose just and favourable working conditions. In fact, they may have a 
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duty (owed to their poorest residents) not to prevent them from engaging in work that 
will enable them to improve their lives.  
If the above economic analysis is correct and we understand the right to just 
and favourable working conditions as a direct claim to action or forbearance directed 
at state governments, we cannot recognise it as universal at this time as not everyone 
has a valid claim to fulfilment against their government at this time. According to a 
traditional claim-based approach, this means there cannot be a human right to just and 
favourable working conditions.  
One solution to this problem is to suggest that what is required in poorer, less-
developed countries is not immediate fulfilment but ‘progressive realisation’. 
According to such an account there is not a duty on every state government to impose 
a regime that secures these rights straightaway; rather, the governments of poor 
countries should take steps towards achieving the right in the future. This offers a 
promising route for understanding the duties that governments in poorer countries 
have with regards to the right to just and favourable working conditions. It is plausible 
that citizens of a state can demand that their government immediately fulfil a common 
core of basic rights alongside working towards achieving a full list of rights over time. 
Furthermore, this approach can allow us to also identify duties that fall on 
international actors, regional organisations and wealthy states, that require that they 
help poorer states to achieve the full list of rights in the long term. 
However, progressive realisation is not a route that supporters of the strict 
claim-based conception of human rights can take for identifying correlative duties. 
The strict claim-based approach is committed to the idea that for there to be a right 
there must be duty-bearers with specifiable duties the fulfilment of which constitutes 
the fulfilment of the right for every right-holder. Progressive realisation suggests that 
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many states have a duty to progressively realise the right rather than a duty to fulfil it. 
According to the traditional claim-based approach described above, this means that, 
strictly speaking, such a state’s citizens do not have a right to just and favourable 
working conditions but only a right to their government working towards bringing 
about just and favourable working conditions in the long term. This means we can 
only identify a human right to have efforts made to progressively realise just and 
favourable working conditions, and not a human right to just and favourable working 
conditions – a right that, according to this account, is only held by those who are 
citizens of developed states.8 
In response to this problem, we could either find a different correlative duty-
bearer, give up the notion that there is a human right to just and favourable working 
conditions, or relinquish the idea that human rights are direct moral claims to action 
or forbearance that every contemporary person can immediately demand of 
identifiable existing agents.9  
It is not clear what other agent could be identified as having duties to fulfil an 
individual in a developing state's right to just and favourable working conditions: 
there is no global government that can be held responsible for fulfilling these rights, 
and the global population is not currently an agent because it lacks both the decision-
making mechanism or the ‘we-intentions’ that are required for group agency 
(Tuomela and Kaarlo 1988, Isaacs 2011).10 In the absence of another candidate duty-
bearer, we would be wise to consider a move away from a strictly claim-based 
account that identifies human rights as direct claims to action or forbearance owed to 
every contemporary person by a specified existing agent. Doing so opens up the 
possibility of a different understanding of human rights. In the next section I propose 
a social structural approach to the right to just and favourable working conditions. 
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This approach shares the traditional moral approach’s commitment to recognising 
human rights as moral demands that all contemporary persons can make, yet it 
envisions them as being standards that the social structure must fulfil as a matter of 
fundamental justice rather than as direct claims to action or forbearance directed at 
some existing agent.11  
 
A structural account of the right  
We could understand the right to just and favourable working conditions as a standard 
that the social structure must meet for every human as a matter of fundamental justice. 
Such an approach responds to the fact that work done under conditions that are not 
just and favourable undermines the basic interests and essential dignity of workers by 
suggesting that fundamental justice requires a social structure in which all people are 
secure from such work. Such an approach understands every individual as having a 
right not to be in a social structural position in which they are vulnerable to being 
subjected to conditions at work that are not just and favourable.12  
This approach builds upon Iris Marion Young’s concept of social structure. 
Drawing on Rawls’ concept of ‘basic structure’ (Rawls 1972), Young identified social 
structure not as a distinct part of the social world, but as a particular way of looking at 
the whole of social life (Young 2006, 2011). Young described how social institutions, 
practices and processes come together to enable and constrain people in particular 
ways and thus have a pervasive impact on their lives. Social structure understood in 
this way is a basic sociology that tracks various positions within society and the 
relationships between them, recognising trends and patterns that persist over time. In 
a similar vein, A.J. Julius (2003) elaborates on the concept of ‘the basic structure’, 
describing it as a sort of crude sociology that tracks how individuals face certain 
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situations and then reproduce those situations over time through the pattern of actions 
those situations tend to induce them to take. Julius explains that in this way the basic 
structure is relatively stable over time.  
According to the structural approach to the right to just and favourable 
conditions of work, an individual’s right is only fulfilled when they are in a social 
structural position where they are secure from unfavourable and unjust working 
conditions, rather than it being fulfilled when they happen to receive just and 
favourable conditions of work from their employer. According to this approach, 
human rights primarily concern not the conduct of individuals but the nature of social 
structure. This account recognises the fact that being vulnerable to substandard pay 
and working conditions is a significant injustice even when this vulnerability does not 
result in actually working under such terms and conditions.13 
An agent is in a structural position where they are vulnerable to accepting 
work under conditions that are not just and favourable when their available options 
for making a living involve accepting work under conditions that are not guaranteed 
to be just and favourable or accepting other burdens that they have reason to consider 
to be even worse. This is the case when the burdens attached to other options are 
either objectively worse than work that does not meet the conditions for being just 
and favourable, or when these options undermine or violate the individuals’ 
fundamental commitments or deep preferences (Taylor 1985).14 In general, those who 
live from their labour are vulnerable to accepting work under conditions that are not 
just and favourable when for the jobs for which they are eligible (that is, able to 
access and perform) there is a ‘buyers’ market’ in employment (labour supply 
significantly exceeds demand) and poor treatment at work is not effectively prevented 
by governmental coercion or social sanction. 
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The right to just and favourable working conditions, understood as a right to 
be in a social structural position in which one is not vulnerable to accepting work on 
terms that are not just and favourable, is multiply realisable: many iterations of social 
structure would fulfil this standard. In order to better understand what the structural 
interpretation of the right requires, some ways in which the standard could be met will 
now be outlined. 
In a modern globalised economy, all strategies for the fulfilment of the right to 
just and favourable working conditions are unlikely to work if applied only within one 
state that is open to global markets, as this is likely to lead to production moving 
abroad. Thus, in order to avoid a ‘race to the bottom’, securing workers’ rights 
requires collaboration across borders in order to effectively regulate labour markets. 
This could be done indirectly by adopting international measures that enable states to 
effectively enforce standards, or directly by regulating the global labour market using 
international governance agencies.15 
One way in which a social structure could comply with the human rights 
standard would be for effective governing agents to impose a regime that reliably 
prevents workers from being subjected to poor conditions at work. This could be 
achieved by the coercive imposition of minimum conditions by an effective leviathan 
(like a state government). Such an approach protects employers from the downward 
pressure on wages and conditions and thus allows them to pay their workers more 
while maintaining profitability. In doing so it protects employees from poor treatment. 
This approach involves coercively imposing legal duties that resemble the duties 
discussed above in the interactional ‘employer as primary duty-bearer’ approach. 
Thus, the structural approach identifies the coercive imposition on employers of a 
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duty to provide decent conditions as one possible means to fulfilling the human right 
to just and favourable working conditions. 
Non-vulnerability to indecent conditions could also be secured by improving 
the bargaining positions of those who have reason to work. This could be done by 
providing an independent source of income, or guaranteeing a certain level of wealth. 
A basic income scheme of the kind advocated by Van Parijs could potentially achieve 
this if provided at a sufficiently high level (Van Parijs 1992, Standing 2005). The 
growth of a strong trade union movement that improves pay and conditions by 
increasing the bargaining power of labourers through coordination and collective 
bargaining could also improve pay and conditions and prevent vulnerability, and in 
this way secure the right to just and favourable working conditions. A social structure 
could also meet the standard through governing agents organising production in a way 
that is not based on wage labour. This would involve imposing a system for governing 
property and working relations that does not leave a sector of the population non-
reciprocally dependent on others.  
 
Duties with regards to requirements of fundamental justice 
The structural approach to the right to just and favourable working conditions 
suggests that people around the world must live in a social structure in which they are 
secure from poor working conditions. Thus, the right outlines fundamental justice 
standards that the social structure must meet with regard to every individual. Unlike 
the traditional claim-based approach, the structural approach does not identify human 
rights as direct claims to action or omission by some existing agent or set of agents. 
Thus it rejects claimabilty as an existence condition for human rights: it suggests that 
people can have a human right even in the absence of the identification of a duty-
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bearer and a duty the fulfilment of which constitutes the fulfilment of the right and is 
owed to the right-holder. 
However, the existence of such a right does affect what individuals, and 
collectives, have reason to do because these agents have stringent duties per the 
requirements of fundamental justice (and human rights are a matter of fundamental 
justice). Below, some of the duties agents have with regard to achieving fundamental 
justice will be briefly explored. However, I will resist the idea that the right is a direct 
claim that agents fulfil the duties specified. According to the structural account, it is 
not individual rights that justify the imposition of individual duties. Rather, it is the 
sum total of all human rights that justify all the duties to collectivise and secure them.  
Thus the account proposed states that the right is a standard that the social structure 
must meet as a matter of fundamental justice and not a claim to action or omission by 
any particular agent or agents. Thus the articulation of these duties should not be 
taken as part of the articulation of the right itself.  
The duties outlined below are pro-tanto duties. This means they are duties that 
the named agents should comply with unless there is some special circumstance that 
can justify their non-compliance. The importance of ensuring fundamental justice 
means that there will be few other moral concerns that can excuse non-compliance. 
However, in some cases there will be circumstances that make it unreasonable for 
agents to comply and thus their non-fulfilment is excused. These will typically be 
cases where the agent is either unable to fulfil the duty or can only do so by violating 
some even more stringent requirement of morality. 
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Individuals 
No individual can unilaterally ensure a social structure in which no person is in a 
social position where they are vulnerable to accepting work under conditions that are 
not just and favourable. However, individuals can contribute to the realisation of such 
a right. We can identify all persons as having a pro-tanto ‘collectivization duty’ that 
require they work towards fulfilling the right alongside fulfilling other demands of 
fundamental justice.  
A ‘collectivization duty’ is defined as ‘a duty to perform responsive actions 
with a view to there being a collective agent that can reliably address a morally 
pressing circumstance’ (Collins 2013). According to Collins' (2013) account, once the 
individuals have established a collective agent, the agent gains a duty to perform a 
circumstance-addressing action. She explains that, in order to fulfil this duty, the 
collective must decide on a plan of action and assign duties and responsibilities to 
members who together will address the circumstance effectively. She proposes that 
after the collective has been formed, each member of the collective has a duty to 
perform the role assigned to them by the collective in the collective action to address 
the circumstance. Collins also suggests that in less complex situations individuals can 
act responsively to address a morally pressing circumstance without creating a formal 
collective with a full decision-making mechanism. Instead, they simply react to each 
other’s actions so as to sensibly address the situation directly. This works best when 
there is obviously a single best way to respond to the circumstance.16  
In the case of fundamental standards of justice (like the human right to just 
and favourable working conditions) we can identify every capable human (including 
those currently vulnerable to work that is not just and favourable) as having a pro-
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tanto collectivization duty. This duty requires the individual to act responsively with a 
view to establishing a collective able and willing to ensure the social structure fulfils 
standards of fundamental justice. Once formed, such a collective can alter the 
structure by regulating action, reforming social practices and directly intervening to 
ensure that requirements of fundamental justice are met. Such a collective gains a 
duty to fulfil this task upon forming. To discharge the duty the collective will assign 
duties, roles, obligations and responsibilities. Those who are assigned duties, roles 
and obligations by the collective will then have a moral duty to fulfil those, so long as 
the allocation of assigned duties is not grossly unfair, compliance does not violate 
other moral duties, and the collective’s plan offers a potential means of promoting 
justice, all things considered.17 It is important to also note that even after such a 
collective has been formed, individuals retain a duty to take responsive action to 
ensure that the collective can and does discharge the responsibility fairly and 
effectively. This means that where there is a collective that can and should ensure a 
social structure that fulfils human rights, individuals will have duties to ensure that it 
does so. When a collective agent with a duty to fulfil human rights fails to adequately 
fulfil standards of fundamental justice, then individuals will have duties to act 
responsively in order to ensure that the collective agent reforms so as to fulfil the 
right. This will usually require individuals to form a smaller collective (like a pressure 
group) and take necessary (and permissible) political action(s) to ensure that in the 
future the larger collective fulfils its obligations. 
All people have duties to collectivise in order to achieve the fulfilment of 
demands of fundamental justice as part of their positive duty to promote and support 
justice. Individuals also have duties to ensure the social structure fulfils human rights 
standards, because they contribute to the reproduction of social structure. Where the 
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social structure reproduced by individuals fails to meet human rights standards, those 
individuals have contributed to the reproduction of a structure that violates human 
rights. In such circumstances, individuals could avoid future contributions to this 
violation of human rights if they form a collective and act together to regulate 
behaviour or alter practices so as to avoid the future structural violation of these 
rights. Thus it could be argued that all capable people have duties to collectivise as a 
way of lowering the risk of their contributing in the future to the structural violation 
of the right.  
Responsive action that aims at establishing and maintaining a collective 
capable of alleviating the structural violation of human rights increases the chance 
that a collective will be formed and maintained. If such a collective is formed and 
maintained it can reliably regulate action and take intervening actions to prevent the 
structural violation of human rights. Thus, responsive action aimed at establishing and 
maintaining such a collective is a reasonable precaution that those who contribute to 
social structures that violate human rights must take. If an agent takes such responsive 
action they will reduce the risk of the structural violation of human rights resulting 
from the aggregation of their own actions with those of others in the future. The idea 
of a precautionary duty to avoid future contributions to unjust social structures is 
something I have discussed at greater length elsewhere (Kahn 2014, 2016). 
 
Employers 
Employers and the individuals that are part of employer companies also have the 
positive and negative collectivization duties outlined above (provided they are the sort 
of agents that can have moral duties). Furthermore, their close connection to workers 
may mean they have additional moral reasons to work towards a social structure that 
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secures workers’ access to just and favourable working conditions and ensures their 
workers are not vulnerable to working under conditions that are not just and 
favourable. 
In additions, such agents could have pro-tanto duties not to employ others on 
conditions that are not just and favourable. This duty is important and in most 
circumstances if agents fail to fulfil it they are at fault. However, it is important to 
recognise that there are circumstances (such as those discussed in the employer as 
primary duty bearer section above) in which failure to comply with this pro-tanto duty 
is permissible. In non-ideal conditions of significant injustice, persons and 
organisations will sometimes face a scenario where they have a choice between 
employing people on terms that are indecent or leaving them to face an even worse 
fate. In these conditions it is not clear they should be condemned if they employ 
individuals on terms that are not just and favourable. In non-ideal conditions this duty 
will be trumped by the need to improve the prospects of those who are extremely 
badly off. 
 
Governments 
The structural approach recognises that state governments have duties to secure social 
structures of the kind outlined above within their territories as far as this is possible 
while fulfilling other urgent claims of fundamental justice, including reducing 
extreme poverty. Where current conditions make it unwise or impossible to 
immediately and unilaterally fulfil the right, state governments have duties to 
progressively realise the right by working with local, regional and global institutions 
and organisations to take steps to secure the structure required. These are 
collectivization duties: they require that state governments act responsively with a 
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view to establishing a broader collective willing and able to reform structure in such a 
way as to secure individuals from vulnerability to working under conditions that are 
not just and favourable. In current conditions of globalization this will require their 
collaborating with governments, international governance agencies and in some cases 
NGOS and multi-nationals. 
 
Summary of duties 
The structural approach understands people as having a legitimate claim not to live 
within a social structure in which they are vulnerable to accepting work on terms that 
are not just and favourable. With regard to this right, the account recognises a number 
of duties falling on different agents at different levels. All capable moral agent have 
duties to collectivise and secure the right in order to promote or maintain fundamental 
justice standards and as a precaution against contributing to future fundamental 
injustice. Governments (as agents formed via collectivization in order to secure 
justice) have a duty to secure the right immediately if they can responsibly do so, and 
if not, a duty to progressively realise the right collaborating with other governments 
and international institutions where necessary. It has been noted that effective 
collectivization to secure the right to just and favourable working conditions will 
involve the collective assigning and enforcing duties of various kinds, and that agents 
will have a moral duty to comply with these duties if doing so is morally permissible 
and the distribution of burdens and benefits is not grossly unfair. It has also been 
suggested that all agents have a pro-tanto moral duty not to employ others on 
conditions that do not meet the standards outlined in the right. 
In order to complete this survey of duties that agents have with regard to the 
right to just and favourable working conditions understood as structural standards, we 
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should also note that all agents have a duty not to act in such a way as to increase 
individual's vulnerability to working under conditions that are not just and favourable 
either individually or as part of a collective. This rules out taking action to undermine 
governance institutions or norms that protect the right. It also rules out taking 
individual or collective action that alters policy or norms so as to increase the 
vulnerability of a sector of the population to working in conditions that are not just 
and favourable. 
 
Example 
 I would like to conclude this section by offering a concrete example of 
individuals, governments, employers Trans-National Corporations and NGOs 
fulfilling collectivization duties to pursue the fulfilment of the right to just and 
favourable working conditions (understood structurally). The accord on fire and 
building safety in Bangladesh is an example of the sort of action recommended by the 
account of collectivization duties outlined in this paper. The accord is a legally 
binding agreement, brought about by trade unions in collaboration with the 
International Labour Organization, the Bangladesh Ministry of Labour and 
Employment, trans-national retailers, the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and 
Exporters Association and NGOs. It seeks to secure safe working conditions for 
garment workers in Bangladesh and is a great example of the sort of efforts that the 
theory here suggests are required (Evans 2014, Bangladesh 2017). The action 
involves the forming of a collective and the undertaking of coordinated action aimed 
at making a structural change that effectively improves the security of safe and 
healthy conditions for garment workers in Bangladesh and thus improves the 
fulfilment of the right to just and favourable working conditions for the Bangladeshi 
  
23 
working class. The initiative seeks to preserve the garment industry of Bangladesh 
and the jobs it creates while securing much better conditions in terms of health and 
safety. Consumers contribute to the structural change by supporting the NGOS that 
helped bring it about, utilising retailers that signed the agreement and boycotting 
those companies (Walmart and Gap) that source from Bangladesh but refused to join 
the accord. Those assigned duties under the accord gain moral duties to comply with 
its demands. The wider public gain duties to monitor the situation and take responsive 
action if the accord breaks down or is undermined. 
 
Is this really a matter of human rights? 
Understanding the right to just and favourable working conditions in structural terms 
involves rejecting the traditional account of human rights that specifies that they must 
be direct claims to action or omission made of identifiable agents. To such an 
approach it could be objected that since the 'right' identified is not a direct demand for 
action or omission by an identified agent it should not be identified as a right but 
should instead be acknowledged to be a goal for social policy (Cranston 1983, O'Neill 
2005). 18 Critics could argue that the account of the human right to just and favourable 
working conditions articulated here does not fulfil the distinct normative role that the 
term ‘right’ plays in moral analysis. They could insist that we reserve the term ‘right’ 
for direct claims to action or forbearance owed to a particular individual and thus 
reserve the term ‘human right’ for identifying valid and urgent claims to action or 
omission that all contemporary persons can make of identifiable agents.  
 So long as it is acknowledged that not all of the urgent priorities of justice 
owed to every individual are human rights then there is nothing internally inconsistent 
with this way of understanding the situation. However, I would argue against such an 
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approach as follows. At present the concept of a ‘human right’ is often used to 
identify the most important demands of fundamental justice that are urgently owed to 
every contemporary individual. These rights are widely understood to take priority 
over demands of justice that are not human rights issues. In such a context, restricting 
the list of human rights to those that can be formulated as valid claims to direct action 
of forbearance from identifiable agents for all contemporary individuals is 
problematic. Doing so forces us to identify only concerns that can be achieved for all 
through unilateral action or omission by existing agents as being fundamental and 
taking priority. It would be a mistake to assume that only that which can be achieved 
by unilateral action by existing agents can be an urgent requirement of fundamental 
justice owed to every contemporary individual. To do so would be to arbitrarily 
relegate to a lower level any claims that in current circumstances require 
collectivization to be achieved. This creates a status-quo bias and condemns those 
living under governing institutions that lack power due to internal or external 
constraints to having lesser rights. 
To avoid the arbitrary prioritisation of those requirements of justice that do not 
require collectivization to be achieved, we must either expand the understanding of a 
human right to go beyond direct claims on existing agents to action or forbearance, or 
admit that human rights should not trump all other concerns of justice – and thus 
accept that human rights do not cover all the urgent requirements of fundamental 
justice owed to individuals. Given the prevalent use of the term ‘human rights’ in 
current public discourse and existing human rights practice, it seems to me preferable 
to embrace a broader understanding of what can be a human right in order to allow 
the inclusion of primarily structural claims that require collectivization to be met for 
all agents in current conditions. 
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Conclusion 
The structural approach to the right to just and favourable working conditions 
identifies the right as requiring that no agents be in a social position in which they are 
vulnerable to working in conditions that are not just and favourable. Thus, it 
recognises the right as identifying minimum conditions that the social structure must 
meet for every person as a matter of fundamental justice. It takes the question of what 
duties agents have to promote the fulfilment of requirements of fundamental justice as 
a secondary question. However, it does recognise that identifying something as a 
requirement of fundamental justice affects the moral duties of persons, governments 
and organisations.  
The account outlined above is controversial in its disconnection of rights from 
duties. According to the structural account, it is not individual rights that justify the 
imposition of individual duties. Rather, it is the sum total of all human rights that 
justify all the duties to collectivise and secure them. This is a radical departure from 
traditional accounts of human rights. However, this approach is in keeping with the 
contemporary use of the term ‘human rights’ to identify a series of internationally 
recognised demands of justice owed to individuals.  
The structural account is also controversial in that it does not identify the 
primary role of human rights as being to protect individuals from collectives. It 
suggests that human rights are just as much about protecting individuals from social 
forces as they are about protecting individuals from powerful collectives. It 
recognises that essential dignity and fundamental interests need to be secure not just 
from the intentional actions of powerful collectives but also from aggregative harms 
that emerge from individuals’ actions (Kahn 2014). By acknowledging this fact, the 
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account avoids a bias towards only protecting individuals’ fundamental interests and 
essential dignity from powerful collective agents. 
The key advantage of the structural approach over the traditional claim-based 
approach to the right to just and favourable working conditions is that it outlines a 
right that can exist even in non-ideal conditions where there are sectors of the 
population that could benefit from employment under conditions that do not meet 
basic standards. In these conditions there can still be a right to a social structure in 
which low-skilled workers are no longer in such a position. By understanding the 
right in this structural way we formulate a fundamental claim of justice that all 
contemporary individuals can make that is not vulnerable to the economic objections 
outlined in this paper.  
Furthermore, the validity of this demand is not dependent on the abilities of 
existing governing arrangements. In fact the right can be used to criticise these 
arrangements and demand change. The right is limited not by existing governance 
arrangements but by what existing agents can reasonably be expected to achieve 
through collectivization. This means that workers across the world can be identified 
as having a right to just and favourable working conditions in contemporary times. 
This right is neither impossible nor unreasonable when understood as primarily 
outlining a standard that the social structure must meet as a matter of fundamental 
justice. 
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Notes 
 
1. Pogge’s prioritisation of ‘official disrespect’ and concern for what is coercively imposed 
moves his final account away from seeing rights as outlining conditions that social 
structure (broadly construed) must fulfil. 
2. This paper focuses on aspects of the ICESCR that concern securing adequate conditions 
of work rather than ensuring fairness in treatment relative to others (equal pay for equal 
work and equality of opportunity for promotion). The choice is not made because the 
demands concerning non-discrimination are less important; rather it is because it is 
rights to a decent standards that can be criticised on the basis that a duty to provide such 
things cannot reasonably be claimed at this time in all places. The argument against 
fairness requirements being fulfilled at this time is less plausible. 
3. The use of the term ‘favourable’ in the ICESCR implies that the required working 
conditions go beyond the minimal standards required in order to avoid undermining the 
fundamental interests or essential dignity of those who work for a living. However this is 
misleading, as the conditions outlined in the convention can plausibly be understood as 
being required in order to avoid undermining workers’ fundamental interests or 
essential dignity in contemporary societies. 
4. O’Neill (2005) suggests that for there to be a human right it must be the case that for 
each human every other person is a duty-bearer. However, there is no need for the 
duties must be universal. What really matters is that the claims are universal: that every 
contemporary human can make them. My interpretation of the claimability requirement 
is more demanding than that suggested by Jesse Tomalty (2014) who only requires that 
rights have a direction and an object. 
5. He also objects that workers’ rights cannot be human rights because not all humans are 
workers. However, as this paper outlines, we can formulate the rights to just and 
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favourable working conditions in such a way that avoids this issue by identifying it as a 
right not to be employed under conditions that are not just and favourable. 
6. Cranston (1983) appears to adopt this understanding in his critique of many purported 
human rights as ‘impossible’, as discussed above. 
7. This understanding of the economics of the situation can be disputed. There is research 
that suggests that labour regulation and union activity have positive outcomes for the 
poor even in industrialising countries (Freeman 2009). Some suggest that, in fact, 
developing countries can adopt higher wages without undermining development or 
lessening investment. Rather than engaging with this empirical dispute I will assume 
that the economists who warn against the immediate imposition of strict labour 
standards by governments in poorer states are correct, and explore whether this gives 
us reason to dismiss the idea that there can be a human right to just and favourable 
working conditions. I explore whether a philosophical account of the right can survive 
such a critique. 
8. In keeping with this way of dealing with difficulties regarding claimability, Collins 
(2016) has suggested that there is a human right to socio-economic consideration rather 
than a human right to subsistence. 
9. Alternatively, we could reject the economic analysis offered above and insist that state 
governments can fulfil the right to just and favourable working conditions in current 
conditions while developing their economies and reducing poverty. We can then retain 
an account of the right as a direct claim on state governments.  
10. For a rejection of the agency condition for duty-bearers and an account of the global 
population as duty-bearer in spite of its lack of agency, see Wringe (2010). 
11. One response for those wishing to rescue human rights from the traditional claim-based 
approach is to recognise rights as interests that are sufficient to ground moral duties. This 
approach weakens the traditional account of the logic of rights by not requiring that rights 
always result in a duty compliance with which cannot be excused and the fulfilment of which 
constitutes the fulfilment of the right. According to such an account, the duties that result from 
a right can change depending on the circumstances. This approach must defend itself from the 
worry that it reduces human rights to significant human interests and thus makes the term 
‘right’ redundant. For further discussion see Cruft (2012) and Tomalty (2014). 
12. Henry Shue’s (1996) proposal that a right provides a rational basis for a justified 
demand that the actual enjoyment of the substance of a right be socially guaranteed 
against standard threats shares some elements in common with the structural 
interpretation outlined here. The structural approach suggests that the right primarily 
requires that the substance (just and favourable working conditions) should be socially 
guaranteed from standard threats. 
13. This is in keeping with the idea that domination is unjust even when the dominated do 
not suffer interference because a dominus chooses not to exercise their power in ways 
that harm or restricts them (Pettit 1997, Young 2011). 
14. By a fundamental commitment I mean a core part of an individual’s motivational set that 
they hold as key to living a good life. According to this definition an individual can still be 
vulnerable to accepting work under conditions that are not just and favourable when 
work is available under just and favourable conditions if that work requires engaging in 
practices to which they are fundamentally opposed. 
15. For further discussion see Ronzoni (2016). 
16. Collins’ account shares some of the features of Virginia Held’s account (1970) of 
responsibilities that can fall on a random collective. Held expresses a similar idea to 
Collins, but instead of distinguishing collectivization duties she identifies the aggregate 
as having a responsibility. This approach is more controversial than Collins’ because it 
involves assigning responsibility to a non-agent. 
17. This to some extent reflects Ronald Dworkin's complex account of associative duties 
(1986).  Dworkin lays out how individuals gain specific duties based on their non-
voluntary membership of associations so long as those associations meet certain 
standards. This section also draws to some extent on the work of Collins and Lawford-
Smith (2016) regarding the transfer of duties to states but differs from their account in 
some respects. 
18. An anonymous reviewer helpfully brought this worry to my attention. 
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